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Summary findings
Countries seeking rrembership  in the European Union  But Hungarv could look for models in the Nordic
(EU) cannot look to the EU for a blueprirnt for reforming  countries (especially Norway and Sweden), Austria, and
their system for taxing capital income. Indeed, it is hard  Finland, which have undertaken  far-reaching reforms of
to generalize about tax systems in the EU.  capital income taxation.
Most member states apply fairly low tax rates to  In most EU countries capital gains are either not
interest payments and discriminate against profit  (directly) taxed or are not taxed systematically. In
distributions. But tax rates, exemption levels, and  Finland and Norway identical tax rates are applied to all
methods of tax integration differ greatly within and  types of capital income, including capital gains.
across countries, and there is almost no harmonization  of  The centerpiece of the "Scandinavian model" is a dual
methods for taxing capital income. Approaches to taxing  income tax, combining a progressive tax on personal
capital gains vary greatly, and distortions arise from the  income with a flat-rate tax on all types of capital income.
treatment  of various sources of capital income.  The Scandinavian model contrasts sharply with the
In 1993, when the EU began efforts to integrate capital  "comprehenisive  income taxation" model, under which a
markets, member countries proposed various ways to  single (progressive) tax schedule is applied to income
harmonize capital incorme  taxes, including a proposal to  from.  all sources.
introduce a withholding tax on interest income of  In Austria the treatment of different types of capital
residents of member states, with a minimum rate of 15  income is relatively uniform but the composite tax
percent  (revised to  10 percent). Under this scheme all  burden on capital income resembles the highest personal
interest on bank deposits and government and private  income tax rate rather than a reduced rate. Austria's rate
bonds would be taxed and there might also be a final  of tax evasion tvas high, but a 10 percent withholding
withholding tax on residents' interest income. But the  tax applied to all interest-bearing assets has reduced
proposal was not accepted and the EU Commission  discrimination against honest taxpayers.
decided to maintain the status quo, not to pressure
member countries to harmonize company taxes.
This paper  -a  product of the Poverty Reduction and Econor.mic  Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia  - is
part of a larger effort in the region to research issues related to the European Union's accession of Central and Eastern
European countries. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NV,  Washington, DC
20433.  Please contact Jennifer  Smith, room1  H11-093,  telephone 202-458-7215,  fax 202-477-1440,  Internet  address
jsmith3i@qworldbank.org.  March 1998.  (38 pages)
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This paper reviews the Hungarian  experience  with taxation  of capital income since  the beginning  of the
transition.  It assesses the performance  of the tax system,  then asks whether lessons can be leamed from
reforms recently undertaken in European Union countries to improve capital income tax laws. The
paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 presents a conceptual framework for the taxation of capital
income. The next section describes  the salient  features of the system in operation in Hungary between
1988 and 1996, then assesses the incidence of the tax and the revenue performance of the system.
Section 3 briefly  reviews capital income  taxation in EU countries and describes  the reforms undertaken
recently in  Scandinavian Countries and  in  Austria. Finally, section 4  makes  suggestions for
improvements in the Hungarian system inspired by the latter reforms, in the general perspective of
harmonizing  Hungary's  tax system  with EU systems.
Hungary was the first transition economy to carry out a major tax reform. Personal income tax and
value-added  tax systems  were introduced in 1988 followed,  in 1989, by a unified  Enterprise Profit Tax
(later renamed Corporate Income Tax). Even though tax administration  has coped well with the
massive  increase in the number of new businesses,  the performance  of the tax system as a whole has
not been entirely satisfactory. Tax policy has been very unstable, with frequent changes in rates
combined with numerous targetted tax preferences, for foreign investors in particular, creating a
nontransparent system of tax distortions  and resulting in revenue losses.  For the taxation of income
from financial  assets, Hungarian authorities  have followed  a schedular approach treating income from
different sources differently. The approach followed  is similar,  in some respects, to the so-called  "dual
income tax approach" (more on this below) in which the wage income is progressively  taxed while
interests, dividends  and capital gains are subject to a flat-rate tax. However, it creates distortions by
taxing differentially  the retums on different  types of assets. In our conclusion,  we suggest to reform the
system along "Scandinavian"  lines:  this would have the advantage  of not requiring a radical departure
from the  present system while improving the incentive structure. This would  probably increase
domestic savings and capital inflows, and be a useful contribution  in leveling  the playing  field for the
development  of capital markets. Such a reform would not address  the distortion  introduced by inflation
which acts as an implicit  tax on the real return of assets but, barring a move toward taxing real rather
than nominal returns (which is not attempted by any existing tax system), this problem would exist
regardless  of the system one choses for taxing capital  income.
I  Jean-Jacques  Dethier  is wiith  the World  Bank and Clwistph John  with the Department  of Economics  at Konstanz
Unierty,  Gennany. At the time  of writing,  he was a Sumuner  Intern at the World  Bank.  Veiy useful  comments  by
Lz1l6 Akar  (Ministry  of Finance),  Almos  Kovics (National  Bank of Hungary)  and Witold  Orlowski  on an earlier  draft
are gratefully  acknowledged.-2-
Section  1 - Conceptual  Framework
Capital income includes returns on investment in  financial and real assets.  Individuals receive
income from financial assets, in the form of interest payments (on bank deposits and on private or
public bonds), dividends paid out to them as shareholders, or in the form of capital gains.  Real
assets (such as real estate) generate rents and capital gains.  The focus of this paper is on financial
assets, though many of the statements applying to financial assets carry over to real assets.
Three different tax legislation affect capital incomes: corporate income tax (CIT), personal income
tax (PIT), and withholding tax schemes.2 These taxes apply to various degrees to different forms of
capital income.  The creation of hybrid financial instruments such as zero-bonds (which contain
their entire return as capital gains rather than interest) or profit-sharing bonds (which combine fixed
interest  payments  with  dividend  distributions)  can  be  essentially explained  by  the  need  to
circumvent the tax legislation.
Corporate  and  Personal  Income  Tax
In many countries, capital income is taxed under the corporate and personal income tax.  The
interaction between the tax systems is clarified in figure 1 (taken from Cnossen 2 which applies
particularly  to  the taxation of company profits  (dividends and capital  gains).  However, as
indicated below, it is applicable to the taxation of interest as well.
Conceptually, as shown in figure 1, two pure systems are possible.  At one extreme, there is no
integration at all between corporate and personal income tax.  This is the  so-called ,,classical
system" which implies that (distributed or retained) corporate profits are, first, taxed under the
corporate income tax, then subject to the personal income tax.  The shareholder is not granted credit
for CIT paid on dividends against the personal income tax liability.
At the other extreme, in a full integration system, the corporation is regarded as a ,,conduit" (pass-
through) for company profits. Proponents of this view argue that any separate taxation of corporate
profits is unjustified since they are ultimately channeled to the shareholder (in the form of dividend
payments or capital gains).  This does not preclude the existence of a corporate profit tax, but the
latter represents only a prepayment on the personal income tax liability of the shareholder.
2  We  do  not consider  here  taxes  applied  on  capital  stocks,  such  as  wealth  taxes  or  property  taxes.
3  Cnossen,  1993,  and Sorensen,  1995,  contain recent overviews  on corporate  income tax and its relation to the
personal  income  tax.-3-
Figure  1: Taxation  of Corporate  Profits:  Relation  of CIT and  PIT
Relation  CIT and PIT
No integration:  Integration of  Full integration:
classical  system  distributed profits  conduit system
Corporate  level  Shareholder  level




In practice, in tax systems around the world, the integration of the corporate and personal income
taxes is limited to dividends.  There are two possibilities.  Either integration is undertaken at the
company level.  Complete integration is attained when dividends are fully deductible from taxable
profits  of  the corporation.  This  is  the way  corporate interest payments  are treated.  Partial
integration results from distributed profits taxed at a lower rate than retained earnings (,,split-rate
system").  But integration can be attained at the shareholder's level as well.  Under a system of
imputation, gross dividends are included in the personal income tax base.  Corporate income taxes
are regarded as prepayments and can be deducted from the final income tax liability.  Under a
schedular system, a flat-rate tax applies to dividends (the tax rate being often identical to the lowest
marginal rate of the personal income tax). This guarantees partial relief from double taxation, at
least for shareholders  with a marginal income tax rate above the flat-rate. 4
4  There  are many other  possible  ways  to achieve  full or partial  integration.  The latter  could  be achieved,  for exatnple,
with  all profits  taxed  at  the same  corporate  income  tax rate, but only  parts  of dividends  being  included  in the base  of the
personal  income  tax. Another  way for partial  or full integration  is the "double  split-rate  method"  (effective  in Austria
until 1989)  where  the corporate  as well as the personal  income  tax on dividends  are applied  at reduced  rates.-4-
Interest
Interest income is mainly generated from bank deposits, private bonds, and government bonds.
Since debtors  are normally  allowed to  deduct interest payments from  taxable profits, interest
remains unaffected by corporate taxes.  Instead, interest payments are included in the income tax
base of the creditor exclusively. This is equivalent to an interest-deduction system (lower left box
of figure 1), which, in turn, implies integration of interest taxation into the PIT. 5
As long as corporate income taxes are not entirely removed from dividends, this system results in a
favorable tax treatment of interest.  This provides an argument for using the imputation system for
dividends since, otherwise, dividends would be overtaxed compared to interest income.
Capital Gains
Capital  gains -- in particular, unrealized capital gains -- are rarely taxed under the personal income
tax. No  country  has  yet  tried  to  include  unrealized gains  in  the  personal  income  tax  base
systematically.  Generally, realized capital gains (i.e., the difference between buying and selling
price of an asset) also remain untaxed unless acquisition and sale of a financial asset occurs within a
short period and speculation is suspected.
The fact that capital gains go untaxed under the personal income tax does not mean that they
remain completely untaxed.  Share prices reflect the market value of a firm.  If this market value
increases one-to-one with retained earnings (profits), capital gains are implicitely taxed by the
corporate income tax on retained profits.  Depending on the difference between the corporate tax
rate  on  retained profits  and  the  personal  income  tax  rate  of  the  shareholder, an  over-  or
undertaxation of capital gains compared to other types of income emerges.
An equal tax treatment would be realized by a system of full integration (see figure 1).  In such a
system, capital gains enter the base  of the personal income tax  and a  tax credit is  given for
corporate taxes on retained earniings.  Although full integration has been suggested in  several
studies, no country has yet applied such a system (Cnossen, 1993, p. 7).  There are a number of
reasons for this but the main ones are administrative difficulties and the fact the shareholders could
be forced to pay taxes although actually no income would have been received.
5  The US Treasury  proposes  an alternative  way to tax interest.  The ,,comprehensive  business  income  tax" abolishes  the
deduction  of interest  payments  at the corporate  level.  This  implies  that payments  to equity  holders  (dividends)  and  debt
holders  (interest)  are treated  equivalently.  See  US Department  of the Treasury,  1992.-5-
Withholding Taxes
Most tax  administrations face  difficulties in  taxing  capital  income  at  the  individual level.
Taxpayers can conceal capital incomes when anonymity and bank secrecy is guaranteed. Because
of the  increased international integration of capital markets, tax bases  easily escape domestic
taxation by (legal) tax avoidance or (illegal) tax evasion.  Therefore, to reduce the potential for
revenue losses, withholding tax schemes for capital income are commonly introduced. Most of the
15 Member States of the EU operate withholding schemes to tax interest and dividend payments
(see section 3 below).
Typically, withholding taxes on capital income are flat, applying a uniform tax rate to  gross
payments.  Banks,  corporations, the  Treasury, and  other institutions deduct  a  fixed  share of
payments to creditors or shareholders and transfer it to the tax office.  This is the reason why
withholding taxes are poor instruments to tax capital gains.  The evaluation of capital gains, by
definition, requires comparing asset values at two different points in time.  Therefore the main
virtue of a withholding tax disappears since the valuation of capital gains necessitates precisely the
type of assessment that a withholding tax tries to do away with.
Withholding taxes are either preliminary or final.  In the former case, the withholding tax deducted
from capital income is treated as a prepayment. The final tax liability is determined by the personal
income tax, once taxpayers file their tax returns and an assessment is made.  Assuming that any
corporate income tax is also credited, we are back to the ,,imputation system" (see figure 1) and, as
a result, marginal tax rates on labor and on capital income equalize.  Under a final withholding tax,
no assessment of capital income under the personal income tax takes place.  The tax withheld from
capital income is the final tax liability.  This implies that capital income is taxed separately from
wage income (,,schedular treatment" in figure 1) and that the marginal burdens on labor and capital
income will, in general, differ.
The Dual Income Tax Approach
The Dual Income Tax approach, which is in application in several countries, has received a lot of
interest in academic and political circles recently. 7 This approach combines progressive taxation of
labor income with a flat-rate withholding tax on capital income.  The rate of the capital income tax
6  Briotti,  1994,  p. 68, describes  a scheme  in which  capital  gains are determined  on the basis of the trend of stock
market indices,  and then taxed at  15%.  No comparison  between asset prices when bought  and sold is therefore
necessary. However,  the need for an assessment  remains  since  the period during  which the asset was held by the
previous  owner  must  be taken  into account.
7See  Sorensen,  1994,  Cnossen,  1995,  and Stevens,  1996.-6-
equals the corporate income tax rate (and, in most cases, the lowest marginal rate of the personal
income tax).  No deductions on earnings-related expenses or exemptions are granted.  Final or
prepayment withholding taxes are usually in effect.
Scandinavian countries and Austria, as discussed below, were among the first to introduce such a
system.  Prior to  introducing this  system, strong distributional and  social  concerns led these
countries to follow the so-called ,,comprehensive income tax model".  Under the latter, all income
is  taxed under  the  same schedule, as it  accrues.  Income from  all  sources is  added and  an
appropriate tax  rate  is  then  applied  (thus  guaranteeing that  the  tax  treatment  of  income  is
independent from  its  source).  This  uniform tax treatment  for all  types  of  income makes  it
impossible to give a favorable treatment to ,,unearned" capital income vis-a-vis ,,earned" labor
income.8  The change to a dual income tax system was motivated by two major problems which
made the comprehensive income tax model ineffective and inadapted.  First, high rates of tax
evasion (at least 80% in Austria) on interest income were showing that attempts to  tax capital
income under the same schedule as labor income did not have the desired distributional impact.
Second, the comprehensive income tax system was facing difficulties as global competition and the
integration of world capital markets progressed at an accelerated pace.
Section 2 - The Taxation of Capital Income in Hungary
Hungary operates a system in which dividends are first taxed under the corporate income tax and
then subject to a final withholding tax.  Until 1995, this withholding tax also applied to interest
payments.  Capital gains, de facto, are not taxed at the individual level.  Therefore, the Hungarian
system provides for partial integration of distributed profits (coinciding with the lower right-hand
corner of Figure 1). The scheme has been subject to frequent, almost annual, changes. This section
begins with a description of the provisions of the CIT law, of the withholding tax scheme rules, and
of their interaction.  It then provides an economic assessment of some aspects of the system: its
revenue performance, the impact of inflation on effective tax rates, and distributional effects.
Corporate Income Tax
A uniform corporate income tax (,,entrepreneurs profits tax") was introduced on January 1, 1989 as
part of the entire tax reform package of 1988/89.9 The most significant novelty was the uniform
treatment of businesses, without regard to  ownership structure (state-owned or private,  foreign
8  See  Goode,  1980,  on the comprehensive  income  tax.
9  Under  the previous system, schedular  taxes varying according  to ownership  type and favouring  state-owned
enterprises  were applied  in combination  with  ad hoc confiscation  of profits. As a result,  after tax profits  of companies
were only  a loose  indicator  of company  perfornance.  See  Boote/Somogyi,  1991,  and  Kopits,  1993.-7-
participation) or legal status.  A tax rate of 50% (40% for profits up to  HUF 3 million) was
combined with restrictive rules concerning the tax base.  Depreciation, based on historic costs, was
linear -- often over periods that exceeded the real economic life of the asset.  Loss carry-forward
was possible for 2 years only.
Although tax rates were not exorbitantly high by international standards (Briotti, 1994), restrictive
definitions of the tax base led to a high effective tax burden (Andersson, 1991). This led Hungarian
authorities to introduce a number of far-reaching tax rebates.  Enterprises engaged in agriculture,
forestry, or retail trade received a reduction of 35% of the tax payment due; while a 65% reduction
was granted to company providing cultural, sporting, or educational services. Moreover, to attract
foreign capital and know-how, from  1990 on, generous tax incentives were  offered to  foreign
investors.  Joint ventures received a tax reduction of 20% of the tax due, provided foreign capital
exceeded 20% (or HUF 5 million) of the capital.  In case the capital of the JV exceeded HUF 25
million, the foreign share exceeded 30%, and at least half of the revenues of the JV were obtained
in manufacturing or tourism/hotel, the reduction amounted to 60% in the first 5 years and 40%
afterwards.  Complete tax holidays from CIT in the first 5 years of existence and 60% reduction
afterwards were granted when the former two conditions were met and the joint venture's activity
was in a sector considered to be of economic importance (computer technology, biotechnology,
etc).
The adverse effects of the special tax incentives granted to foreign capital soon became clear.  First,
only small-scale investors were actually attracted by these measures.  For large investors, stable
economic and political conditions as well as well-developed infrastructure and a reliable judicial
system  were  much  more  important (Koltay,  1993).  These  investors  took  advantage of  the
preference, but the tax regime was not an element affecting their decision to settle their business in
Hungary.  Second, the incentives led to an outflow of domestic capital which was then re-imported
as ,,foreign capital" to take advantage of the tax incentives (Genser/John, 1992).  The predicable
result was a loss of tax revenue but no significant impact on economic growth.  It is generally
accepted  that  granting  tax  reductions  is  a  poor  means  of  attracting  foreign  capital
(Mintz/Tsiopoulos, 1994).
Hungarian authorities, therefore, soon began to reform the system of corporate income taxation
(this  reform is still on-going today).  In 1990, the tax rate was reduced to 40% (and 35% on the
first HUF 3 million of taxable profits).  A major reform in 1992 reduced the rate to 36%, uniformly
levied on the entire profit, and introduced less restrictive tax base regulations.  Loss carry-forward
was extended to  5 years, with the possibility of carrying forward indefinitely losses occurring
during the first 3 years of a business.  Depreciation rates were increased (i.e. depreciation times
reduced),  leading  to  depreciation within  3  years  (computers, office  infrastructure), 5  years
(automobiles), 7  years (machine, other assets) and 50 years  (buildings).  As  a  result of these
measures, effective tax rates were reduced.-8-
To address the concern that state-owned enterprises received a favorable treatment, an additional
"dividend tax"  on profits of  state-owned enterprises was introduced at the beginning of  1992,
mimicking dividend payments that private enterprises have to pay out to capital owners (OECD,
1993; the tax was abolished in May 1994).  Thereby a level playing field for all enterprises was
created and disincentives for state-owned enterprises to be privatized were partly removed.
Further changes were introduced in subsequent years.  In 1995, a new CIT scheme was created.
Profits were now subject to a basic tax rate of 18%. On distributed profits, a supplementary tax of
23%  (tax-exclusive) was  levied.  The  total  tax burden  on  dividends, therefore,  increased to
18+ (100  - 18).  23/123=33 1/3 percent.  Tax preferences for joint ventures and other enterprises
were maintained but applied only to the basic tax payment of 18%.  In late 1996, the Parliament
approved another reform  of corporate  income taxation.  The corporate  income tax  rate  was
harmonized at 18% for all company profits, no matter whether retained or distributed.
The  Hungarian approach  of  granting very  generous  special  incentives, especially to  foreign
investors, has been widely criticized. Since it is highly questionable whether the incentives granted
actually were having the desired effect, in 1990, all preferences were limited to 10 years (remember
that initially some of the tax reductions were granted indefinitely) and, in 1994, were completely
abolished.  Existing preferences remained in force, so that the last preferences granted under this
scheme will expire by 2004.10
Withholding Tax
Together with the CIT, the tax on personal income determine the overall tax burden on capital
income. In 1988, taxation of capital income was reformed as part of the entire package to reform
the personal income tax.  Dividends and interest payments were subject to a 20% withholding tax
on capital income. This flat-rate tax was final.  No additional personal income tax was levied on
capital income.  At the  same time,  no  credit was  given for  corporate income taxes paid  on
distributed profits.  The Hungarian system, therefore, can be  described as a  system of partial
integration, i.e., corporate income taxes can not be deducted from personal income tax liabilities,
which, in turn, consist of a final withholding tax at a relatively low rate.
These rules were effective until the beginning of 1994 when, in a move to increase savings, the tax
rate on dividends and interest payments was reduced to  10%.  The other features of the system
10  At the beginning  of 1994,  new incentives  to retain and re-invest  profits  were introduced,  again with an unclear
impact  on investment  decisions  of fims. See  World  Bank,  1995,  p. 15.-9-
remained in place.  In November 1994, interest on deposits and bonds became completely tax-free
but taxes on dividends remained at 10%.  Until end 1996, dividends were therefore taxed at 40%,
which is the combined effect of the basic corporate income tax of 18%, the supplementary tax on
gross profit distributions of 23% and the withholding tax of  10%.  On the other hand, personal
income faced a maximum marginal income tax rate of 48% plus social security contributions.
Hence, owners of unincorporated businesses were  able to avoid taxes by declaring very  high
dividend amounts.1'
In  1997, the tax regime for dividends was again reformed.  The flat-rate tax on dividends was
increased to  20%, up to  a limit, to compensate for a  concommitant reduction in the corporate
income tax rate.  The upper limit is that, as long as dividend distributions as a proportion of total
company capital do not exceed twice the base rate of the National Bank of Hungary, dividends are
taxed at  20%. Dividends exceeding this  limit are taxed  at 27%.  In  addition, social security
contributions have to be paid on this amount.12 The 18% corporate income tax and 27% dividend
tax add up to a tax rate of 40.14%, similar to the treatment of employment income in the highest
bracket under the income tax schedule for 1997 (42%).  The reintroduction of a withholding tax on
interest payments was subject of  extensive discussions in  the  second half of  1996.  Official
statements suggested a  tax rate of  5 - 10%.  Eventually, rules were not  changed and interest
remained untaxed in 1997. Finally, capital gains used to be subject to the personal income tax.  In
1996, the PIT law established a withholding tax of 10% on capital gains (but 0% on discount
bonds).  Since the ability of the tax office, APEH, to detect capital gains as such is doubtful, their
actual taxation still depends on the willingness of taxpayers to declare such gains in their annual tax
returns. De facto, therefore, capital gains escape personal taxation and they are taxed in the form of
CIT levied on retained profits.
Overall Tax Burden
To summarize the changes described above, table 1 shows the evolution of rates of taxes on capital
income and the resulting tax burden from 1988 to 1997.  The tax burden on dividends (last row)
represents the  combined effect of  corporate income  tax and  withholding tax.  Since interest
payments are deductible from corporate profits, the  actual tax rate  on interest is equal to  the
withholding tax rate. Capital gains, as explained above, are effectively taxed by the corporate
11 Owners  of unincorporated  businesses  receive  labor  and capital income,  and hold a controlling  share in the firm.
They can therefore  decide  whether  to take out income  from their business  in the form of  wage,  dividend,  or capital
gains.
12  An example  should  clarify  how the system  works. Suppose  that  the central  bank's  rate is 22%,  dividend  payments
are HUF  600.000,  and the share  capital  of the company  amounts  to HUF  1 million. Therefore,  HUF  440.000  (44%  of
the capital)  of dividends  payments  are subject  to the 20% tax rate, and HUF 160.000  are subject  to 27% dividend  tax
plus social  security  contributions,  generating  tax revenues  of HUF 131.200  plus social  security  contributions.  If all
dividends  had  been  taxed  at 20%,  tax revenues  would  have  been  HUF 120.000.-10-
income tax.  Therefore, the relevant tax burden is equal to the tax rate on retained profits.  The tax
burden on dividends declined steadily between 1989 and 1996. This is the result of rate reductions
in the corporate income tax and in the withholding tax.  Starting at a level of 60% in  1989, the
combined rate fell to 40% in 1996 and is projected to fall further in 1997.  Interest payments have
systematically taxed below this level, thus favoring savings in the form of deposits and bonds rather
than shares.'3
Policy Assessment
Hungarian tax policy has often been criticized for the frequency and ad hoc nature of its reforms.
This applies particularly to  capital income taxation which, as  shown above, has  gone through
almost annual changes creating a climate of instability viewed by some observers as an important
impediment to increased investment and growth. In addition to this general criticism, three specific
issues --discussed in this section-- are worth exarnining.  First is the revenue raising ability of
capital income taxation:  given that the revenue performance has been satisfactory, is there still
room to increase revenues in the future?  Second is the issue of effective tax rate:  given that
Hungary has been stubbornly stuck with inflation between 20 and 30% per year, to what extent
does the tax regime for capital income provide incentives to increase domestic savings? Finally we
examine the issue of whether, for reasons of fairness, capital income taxation should be used to
create a fairer distribution of after-tax income.
Revenue Performance
Capital income taxation in Hungary has fared well in terms of revenue performnance.  The system of
collection in  place  makes evasion virtually impossible since the  tax  amount due  is withheld
automatically when interests or dividends are paid out to capital owners. The latter always receive
net  capital income.  Table  2  shows households income  and  tax revenue  from  such income,
distinguishing between interest and dividends.
3  This  last  point  needs  to be qualified  because  of inflation  (see  section  2, below).Table 1:  Hungary: Capital Income Taxes, 1988 - 1997
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 (planned)
50%  40%  Retained  Retained
Corporate  not existing  (40% on first  (35% on first  40%+4%  40%  36%  36%  Distributed  Distributed  18%
Income Tax  HUF 3 mio  HUF 3 mio  supplement  profits: 33.3%  profits: 33.3%
profit)  profit)
Withholding  Dividends:  Dividends:  Dividends:  Dividends:  Dividends:  Dividends:  Dividends:  Dividends:  Dividends:  Dividends:
Tax on  20%  20%  20%  20%  20%  20%  20%  10%  10%  20% (27% on
Capital  Interest:  Interest:  Interest:  Interest:  Interest:  Interest:  Interest:  Interest:  Interest:  dividends)
20%  20%  20%  20%  20%  20%  10%  0%  0%
(as of Nov 1:  Interest:
dividends: 10%,  0%
interest: 0%)
Resulting Tax  60%  52%  55.2%  52%  48.8%  48.8%  40%  40%  34.4% (40.14%
Rate on  (  f N  I  on ,,excessive"
Dividends  42.4%)  dividends)
Source: Intemational Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. GET V: Taxation and Investment in Central and East European Countries. Amsterdam (loose leaf).
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Table 2: Hungary: Taxes on Household Income, 1989 - 1994
(in billions of Forint)
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
(Budget)  *
Household  Incomes  (cash  and in kind)  1,122.0  1,645.5  2,140.5  2,569.9  2,979.8  3,435.9
of which:
- interest  30.0  40.0  60.0  100.0  100.0  110.0
- dividends  18.0  30.0  40.0  50.0  50.0  50.0
Taxes  on  Personal  Income  98.6  140.5  182.8  225.3  284.6  305.1
of which:
- on interest  6.0  8.0  12.0  20.0  20.0  11.0
- on dividends  3.6  6.0  8.0  10.0  10.0  10.0
* The  Budget  Law  assumes  a tax rate  of 10%  / 20%  on interest  / dividends  over  the entire  year. Actually,  rates  were  reduced  to 0%!
10%  on  November  1, 1994.
Sources:  Ministry  of Finance  and World  Bank  (1995),  Appendix  Table  5.5.
As shown in table 2, interest and dividends accounted for 4.7% of total household income, on
average, between 1989 and 1994. At the same time, taxes on interest and dividends raised 10.2%
of total personal income taxes, thus contributing more than proportionally to tax revenues.  More
importantly, a comparison with total dividend and interest payments unveils that tax revenues equal
20% of the tax base -- in other words, APEH, the tax office, was able to completely exploit the tax
base of capital income. 14 This is a very significant result given that rates of tax evasion are very
high. According to recent estimates, evasion in Hungary varies between 7% of the tax amount due
(corporate income tax) and 25% - 30% (value-added tax, personal income tax).
In  1995, interest received by  individuals and  interest on  government bonds was tax exempt.
Accordingly, the Government has foregone potential revenues from taxing this  source.  These
revenue losses can be estimated on the basis of financial savings of households (see table 3). At the
end of  1995, financial savings of Hungarian households totalled HUF 2,182 billion.  Assuming
average interest rates of 20% on forint deposits and bank securities and 3.5 % on foreign exchange
deposits, potential tax revenues would add up to HUF 20.7 billion, given a tax rate of 10%.  Note
that government bonds and bills remain tax exempt.  The additional revenue foregone would thus
14  This  experience is common to other countries operating withholding schemes (see below).  Ministry of Finance
figures do not match National Accounts data. According  to the latter, interest income in 1991 - 1994 amounted to HUF
48.9;  70.7;  100.6 and  130.2 billion,  respectively.  During  the same  period,  corporate  dividends  totalled  HUF 12.6; 15.5;
20.2  and 32.4 billion, respectively. The difference can only be partially explained by the fact that data in table  2 refers
to taxable payments.-13-
be equal to about 7% of total personal income taxes (HUF 290 billion) or approximately 10% of the
general government deficit in 1995 (HUF 214 billion or 3.9% of GDP).
Table 3: Hungary: Stock of Household Savings in 1995
(in billions of Forint, as of December 31, 1995)
Stock  of savings  Potential  taxable
interest  payments
Cash  and Sight  Deposits  426.4  0
- Forint  380.4  0
- Foreign exchange  46.0  0
Deposits  1,033.7  141.9
- Forint deposits  640.7  128.1
-Foreign  exchange  deposits  393.0  13.8
Securities  613.3  58.6
- Bank  securities  292.8  58.6
-Other  (bonds,  gvt.  bonds,  bills,  stocks)  320.5  0
Provisions  for insurance  premiums  74.7  0
Small  business  deposits  33.9  6.8
TOTAL  2,182.0  207.3
Sources:  National  Bank  of Hungary  (Monthly  Reports)  and own  calculations.
Given very  high  rates of  revenue productivity, withholding taxes  on  capital income  can  be
considered to be a very efficient and reliable tool to raise revenue.  In addition, administration is
cheap and compliance costs for taxpayers low.  Does this  mean that the  Government should
increase tax pressure on capital income? It is important, in this respect, to look at net tax revenues.
The counterpart of taxing interest received by the creditor is deductibility of interest payments on
the part of the debtor, for example a corporation.  In other words, while the government gains
revenue from personal income tax, it loses corporate income tax revenue.  In the extreme, in a
closed economy with lending and borrowing taking place between agents facing identical marginal
tax rates on capital income, both effects cancel each other out and interest taxation raises zero net
1  5 revenue.
15  If, in addition, government bonds are sold, the net tax base (as well as net tax revenue) turns positive, as the
government collects taxes from  bondholders  but does  not  suffer tax  losses incurred  by  deductibility of  interest
payments.-14-
Available empirical studies show that net tax revenues from capital income are negative.16 For
instance, Gordon and  Slemrod (1988), based on the US tax system in  1983, estimate that tax
revenues would increase if capital income taxes were completely eliminated. For Denmark, the net
revenue from taxing capital income in 1986 was estimated to be minus 1.6% of net national income
(Sorensen, 1994). Muten  (1996) reports that the Swedish government in 1994 did not reduce the
tax rate on capital income from 30 to 25% as originally planned though a lower tax rate would have
actually increased tax revenues. Such an empirical exercise cannot be performed for Hungary, in
the framework of this paper, because data requirements are extensive.  When there is precise
information on this, all available empirical studies arrive at a similar conclusion: the ability to raise
additional tax revenue from taxing interest income is very limited.
There are several reasons behind this empirical conclusion. First, given that capital income is taxed
under a progressive income tax, net revenues will be negative when agents with high nominal
marginal tax rates borrow from agents facing low rates.  Second, there is no incentive to forego the
deduction of interest payments but a strong incentive to evade taxes on interest income. As a result,
net tax revenues will tend to turn negative (even under a flat-rate tax).  Third, many countries
operate schemes which combine relatively generous rules for interest deductibility with favourable
treatments of certain types of capital income (returns on pension saving, owner-occupied housing,
etc).  This is particularly the case in Scandinavian  countries and in the US.  As a result, tax arbitrage
implies considerable losses for the tax authority.
In Hungary, however, interest paid by businesses has been treated as a deductible expense all along.
Accordingly, the introduction of a tax on interest income will undoubtedly lead to an increase of
net tax revenues.
Inflation
Inflation has been stubbornly stuck in the 20-30% range in Hungary in the past few years, with .
the rise in the consumer price index averaging 25.7% between 1990 and 1996. This qualifies in the
economic literature as "moderate inflation".  Projections for 1997 point at a possible decline to
about 12-13% by end year.
Inflation influences the burden of taxpayers via two main channels.  First, any progressive tax
system  that has  nominal  incomes as  tax base  will produce "bracket  creeping" in  periods  of
moderate to high inflation.  This is exactly what happened in Hungary since 1990, with bracket-
creeping being a major force underlying the increase in the real tax burden on the employed.
16  Note  that empirical  results  find  that  net revenues  from  taxing  total capital  income,  and  not from  taxing  interest  only,
are negative.-15-
Measures that were taken (such as reduction of tax rates, adjustments of tax bases and tax credits)
have compensated only partly for the decline in real net income -- and actually had a regressive
effect as changes in tax credits have predominantly facilitated the access to credit for high-income
households.'7
Second, owners who do not make adjustments in the nominal value of their assets are hit by
inflation. They are forced to set aside part of their interest income to protect the principal from real
losses.  Taxes are paid out of the remaining real capital income.  The tax system, however, taxes
nominal interest payments.  The implication is that the resulting effective tax rate (i.e. real tax
payments as a share of real return) is higher than the statutory tax rate.  For this reason, inflation is
viewed as an implicit tax on return on assets.' 8
The effective tax rate on interest is defined as
Kr,g  K  Kr,n 1  1
(1)  teff  =  - Kr,g Ki'  Ko
where Ko denotes initial wealth, K  r,g = K0 - equals real gross wealth after one period (with
I+p  I1+
R  for nominal interest and  p for inflation rate), and  K  rn  =  K  l+  (I - tnom)  equals real net
I  I ~~+  p
wealth (with tnom  as the nominal, statutory tax rate), respectively. After some transformation, one
obtains
(2)  teff  =  tnom.  R
R-p
For example, in  Austria, dividends  are taxed under the corporate income tax (344%)  and the
withholding tax (22%), resulting in an  overall tax burden of 48.5%.  The nominal tax rate on
interest is 22%.  However, assuming a nominal return of 6% on financial assets, inflation must not
exceed 3.3% to result in the same effective tax rate of 48.5%.
"  See TARKI  (1995). Bracket-creeping  always  occurs  when there is inflation  when incomes  are taxed with a
progressive  schedule.  Even  when  an income-earner  is fully  compensated  (say,  when an inflation  of 10%  leads  to a rise
of nominal  income  by the same  percentage),  her disposable  income  falls  since the constant  real income  is taxed  at a
higher  average  tax rate.
"'  This  problem  remains  even  when  bracket-creeping  is eliminated,  for example  through  a flat-rate  tax.-16-
For Hungary, table 4 below shows nominal and real interest rates as well as effective tax rates,
using equation (2), between 1988 and 1995.19 Trends in effective tax rates for Hungary are erratic.
Real interest rates were negative between  1988 and  1993 (except for  1992).  Taxing nominal
interest payments resulted in a worsening of disincentives to save.  In 1994, savers were able to
earn positive real interest for the first time.  As shown in table 4, the effective tax rate on interest
income amounted to 50% -- compared to a nominal tax rate of 10% !  After abolishing the tax on
interest payments in November 1994, the effective tax rate fell to zero.
Table 4: Hungary: Inflation, Interest Rates, and Effective Tax Rates, 1988 - 1995
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Inflation  (in  percent,  CPI)  15.8  16.9  29.0  34.2  22.9  22.5  18.9  28.3
Nominal  interest  rate 1  9.0  15.0  27.4  32.5  23.6  16.5  23.6  29.1
Real  interest  rate  2 -5.9  - 1.7  - 1.2  - 1.3  0.5  -4.9  4.0  0.6
Effective tax rate on interest  3 - 26.5  - 149.5  - 349.0  - 363.8  784.3  - 54.8  49.9  0.0
I Unweighted  average  of interest  rates  on  treasury  bills  and deposits.
2 The relation  between  nominal  and real interest  rate r  is given  by I + R = (I + r) *  (I + p) . For small r *  p , the expression  can be
reduced  to R = r + p  for simplicity.
3 Negative  signs  do not indicate  negative  effective  tax rates  (i.e.  a subsidy). Rather,  they are explained  by a negative  denominator  in
(2), which  implies  a negative  tax base  but, nevertheless,  positive  tax payments.
Sources:  IMF  International  Financial  Statistics;  and own calculations.
As highlighted by the data in table 4, inflation distorts saving by discriminating against assets that
are not inflation-proof. Tax policy, in principle, should acknowledge this problem by taxing real
rather than nominal returns.  Such attempts have rarely been undertaken in the past, mainly because
systematic adjustments appear to  be difficult and,  hence, expensive (Sorensen, 1994, p.  63).
Another attempt to account for inflation in the design of the tax system would be to apply reduced
20 tax rates on interest as compared to other types of capital income.  However, this seems to be an
inferior solution because the non-distorting tax differential depends on the actual inflation rate and
would, accordingly, be  subject to permanent change.  In particular, moderate-to-high inflation
economies like Hungary would face the need for constant adjustment.
Even though official statements mentioned that revenue considerations rather than ,,effective tax
rate" considerations were the driving force behind the reform, and even though the tax reduction
19  In principle, effective tax rates should be calculated  using expected inflation rates.  Lacking better data, we used ex-
post outcomes instead.  This is justified in case of perfect foresight of savers, or when inflation forecasts by public
institutions and actual outcomes coincide.
20  Muten, 1996, p. 12, mentions that, in 1994, Swedish authorities chose a tax rate of 30% on capital income for this
very reason. Under reasonable assumptions on interest rates and inflation, the resulting effective tax rate of about 50%
corresponds to the highest marginal PIT rate.-17-
was actually introduced  at a  time  of falling  inflation, it  is  possible that the  decision of  the
Hungarian government to reduce and finally abolish the taxation of interest in 1994 was motivated
partly by the need to account for inflation.  However, the discussions about the reintroduction of
interest taxation through the year 1996 (see above) confused agents and once more highlighted the
ad hoc nature of tax policy.21
To contrast Hungary with other Central European economies, table 5 shows effective tax rates in
the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia.
Table 5: Inflation, Interest Rates, and Effective Tax Rates in Transition Economies
Czech  Republic  Poland  Slovak  Republic
1994  1995  1994  1995  1994  1995
Inflation  (CPI)  10.1  9.1  33.3  26.8  13.4  9.9
Nominal  interest  rate  9.0  9.7  31.1  26.2  10.7  9.0
Effective tax rate on interest  - 130.2  220.3  0.0  0.0  - 59.1  - 153.4
All figures  in %.  In the Czech  and Slovak  Republics,  nominal  tax rates  on deposits  and securities  differ. The effective  tax rates
correspond  to the rate  on deposits.
Source:  IMF:  International  Financial  Statistics,  and  own calculations.
In contrast to Hungary, real interest rates were negative in the Slovak Republic and Poland in 1994
and  1995.  The patterns of  inflation were different, however.  The Slovak Republic reported
inflation of 13% in 1994 and 10% in 1995, which, in combination with a final withholding tax of
15% on deposits, led to high effective tax rates. In Poland, despite inflation rates of 33% and 27%,
respectively, the effective tax burden was zero as interest payments were tax exempt.  The Czech
Republic had positive real interest rates in 1995.  However, because of high inflation and a final
withholding tax of 15%, the effective tax burden reached 220%.
This brief analysis shows that, even if tax rates are modest, the higher the inflation rate, the stronger
the ,,leverage effect" of capital income taxation on interest payments.  Authorities have three
options to counteract this effect, thus providing incentives to increase national savings.  First, of
course, bring inflation under control.  Second, impose a tax on the real value, rather than nominal,
of capital income so as to prevent the principal from being eroded by inflation. 22 Third, tax interest
21  An effective tax rate of 202% would result from a nominal tax rate of 10% in combination with 13% inflation and a
real interest rate remaining at its 1995 level of 0.6% -- another indication for the strong impact of inflation, even when
nominal tax rates are low.
22  Taxing real income would also prevent bracket-creeping from occuring.-18-
at lower rates or avoid taxing capital income altogether.  Each of these measures will reduce
effective tax rates and contribute to the removal of disincentives  to save.
Fairness
Equity and ability-to-pay considerations play a major role in public discussions on capital income
taxation.  As Mintz puts it, "perhaps the most important consideration behind the reluctance of
governments to abandon the taxation of capital income is fairness."23 Should capital income, which
is concentrated on the richest households, be taxed more heavily, on grounds of  fairness, because
labor income is heavily taxed and because workers have less opportunities to avoid paying taxes
(because of withholding)?
Despite the fact that this is a passionately debated topic, neither theoretical arguments nor empirical
evidence militate in favor of reinforcing capital income tax.  At a theoretical level,  intertemporal
equity consideration (life-cycle hypothesis) must be taken into account.  When capital income is
taxed, people with otherwise identical economic characteristics (in particular, the same present
value of lifetime earnings) will pay different amounts of lifetime taxes, depending on the amount
and time pattern of savings.  In particular, an individual will minimize his/her lifetime tax bill by
not saving at all.  From an distributional perspective,  this obviously is a violation of the principle of
horizontal equity since the ability to pay is the same in both cases.
The available empirical evidence shows that taxing capital income more heavily would only have a
negligible distributional impact (in the  sense of making income distribution more egalitarian)
because the tax base is too small.  Evidence from Hungary is provided by a recent study of the
structure and distribution of income (see TARKI, 1995).  5  Table 6 shows the distribution on
income from work, transfers, income from abroad, other income, revenues accounted as expenses,
and capital income.
23  See Mintz  (1994,  p. 1483). The whole  debate  on the flat  tax is a good  example. In the May-June  1996  issue  of the
magazine  "Challenge",  for instance,  Roberts/Sullivan  criticize  the flat  personal  income  tax proposal  on the grounds  that
"under  the flat tax, many of the wealthiest  individuals  would  pay absolutely  no tax.  For example,  a family  whose
income  consists  solely  of millions  of dollars  of dividends,  interest,  and gains  from the sale of stock  held for investment
would  pay  zero  tax."  (p. 25).
24  See  Sorensen,  1994,  for  a simple  numerical  example.  See also  Mintz,  1994.
25  The survey  is based  on a random  sample  of all 4.1 million  income  tax returns  filed by Hungarian  taxpayers  in 1994.
Declared  household  income  amounted  to HUF 1,714.6  billion. The TARKI  study  was commissioned  by the Ministry
of Finance  and financed  by a PHRD  grant  from  the World  Bank  supporting  the Govemment's  public  finance  reform.-19-
Table  6: Composition  of Personal  Income  According  to Tax Returns,  1994
Amount  %
(HUF  billion)
Income from work (wages,  business income,  small  1,385.4  80.8
farm  production,  individual  activities)
Transfers  87.6  5.1
Other  income,  Income  from  abroad  54.4  3.1
Revenues  accounted  as expenses  147.9  8.6
Capital  income  39.3  2.3
SUM:  Total  declared  income  1,714.6  100.0
Source:  TARKI,  1995.
Capital income only makes up 2.3% of total declared income.  This is partly explained by the fact
that ,,capital income", as it appears in tax retums, comprises only interest and dividends on bonds
and shares (domestic and foreign) plus the proceeds from the sale of bonds and shares.  Interest
from  ordinary saving  accounts does not  need to  be  declared in  tax files.  It  should also be
mentioned that tax returns  are a poor  source for assessing capital income, since the reporting
propensity is low.  The survey results may therefore not reflect actual capital income in Hungary.
For  our purposes, however, these results  are useful because they  indicate the willingness of
taxpayers (not) to declare their capital income in tax returns.
The more it is concentrated on wealthy households, the more pronounced is the distributional
impact of capital income tax.  Table 7 shows how strong the concentration of capital income is in
high income households in Hungary. The highest household decile (the richest 10%) earns 81% of
total  declared capital income, compared to  a  share of 36%  in total  income (including capital
income).  The unevenness of the distribution is highlighted by a  Gini coefficient of 0.84, as
26~~~~~~~~~~2
compared to 0.49 for tota  income.2
26  Note that the second column consists of total declared income, i.e., includes capital income. The Gini coefficient
excluding capital income would therefore be lower.-20-
Table 7: Income Shares by Deciles
Decile  Share  in total  declared  Share  in capital
income  income
1  1.2  0.2
2  2.9  0.1
3  4.0  0.4
4  5.2  0.8
5  6.5  1.4
6  7.8  1.9
7  9.4  2.8
8  11.6  3.8
9  15.4  8.1
10  35.9  80.6
Total  100.0  100.0
Gini-coefficient  0.49  0.84
Source:  TARKI,  1995.
Does this build a strong case for taxing capital income, on distributional grounds, since capital
income is extremely concentrated on the richest households? No, because the tax base is too small
so that using capital income taxation as a tool to make income distribution more egalitarian would
not be effective.  Consider the highest income decile which earns 35.6% of total income (HUF
610.4 billion). Capital income makes up HUF 31.6 billion, i.e., 5% of total declared income of this
decile.  Taxing this amount would have a negligible impact on income distribution, regardless of
whether taxation  is  are  flat-rated or  progressive.  The tax  base  is  too  small.  In  addition,
progressivity will increase the incentive to avoid or evade taxes, further undermining the already
small potential for distributive impact.
As an illustration, we present in table 8 a simulation using the 1994 data.  The table shows how
average tax rates on total income (that is, labor income plus capital income) of representative
households respond to different tax schemes. Total income tax payments for each decile are given
assuming that capital income is not taxed (column 4); that capital income is taxed at a flat-rate of
20% (column 5) and that capital income is taxed under the PIT schedule (comprehensive income
27 tax, in column 6).  These results show that, compared with not taxing capital income at all, a flat-
27  By construction, every decile in table 8 contains the same number of taxpayers (namely 431,598) that is, the total
number of tax  filers divided by  10. The average income of every decile is easily calculated by dividing the total
declared income of the decile (obtained by distributing total income reported in table 6 to the 10 deciles by using the
pattern of table 7) by 431,598.-21-
rate tax of 20% or the application of a comprehensive income tax would have a negligible effect on
average tax rates.  The exception is the highest income decile which would experience an increase
of the average tax burden to 37.5% (compared to 35.2% in case of no taxation of capital income).
The problem, however,  is that the highest  income decile undertakes the most  ,,tax-planning"
activities and that the benefit of using such a tax on high income earners would be nullified by tax
avoidance behavior.  Evidence from TARKI and from other sources clearly point to a regressive
effect of legal and illegal methods of tax planning. 28
Table 8: Hungary: Simulating the Distributional Impact of Various Capital Income Tax
Schemes (using 1994 tax return data)
Income  (in  HUF)  Income  Tax  Payments  (in HUF)  *  Average  Tax  Rate  **
Decile  Total  of which:  0% on capital  20%  on capital  CompIT***  0% on capital  20%  on capital  CompIT**
income  capital  income  income  income  income  income
1  49,202  182  0  36  0  0.00  0.07  0.00
2  113,698  91  721  740  740  0.63  0.65  0.65
3  159,564  364  10,300  10,373  10,391  6.46  6.50  6.51
4  207,073  728  22,086  22,232  22,268  10.67  10.74  10.75
5  256,917  1,275  37,975  38,230  38,421  14.78  14.88  14.95
6  311,389  1,730  56,881  57,227  57,486  18.27  18.38  18.46
7  375,386  2,550  78,993  79,503  79,885  21.04  21.18  21.28
8  462,086  3,460  112,950  113,642  114,334  24.44  24.59  24.74
9  612,991  7,357  173,979  175,450  177,216  28.38  28.62  28.91
10  1,424,337  73,374  501,924  516,599  534,208  35.24  36.27  37.51
* Composite  of PIT  on total  income  (excl.  capital  income)  plus  capital  income  tax.
** Taxes  on income  from labor  and capital  divided  by income  from  labor  and capital.
***  Comprehensive  Income  Tax:  capital  income  is taxed  under  the personal  income  tax.
Source:  TARKI,  1995;  and own  calculations.
We can conclude by saying that neither theoretical considerations nor empirical evidence build a
strong case  for more taxation of  capital income for  high  income  earners in  Hungary.  The
simulations above show that the distributive impact would be small.  Even if we are optimistic
about APEH's tax collection rate, the tax office is severely limited in its ability to collect revenue,
28  For example, the TARKI study shows that 82% of all accounted expenses happen to be in the highest income decile.
This source of income is the most unevenly distributed of all.  The results show that, first, evasion of income taxes is
highest and, second, by far the most tax evasion takes place in the highest income decile (probably as much as 90%).-22-
following recent rulings of the Hungarian Constitutional Court stressing privacy rights of taxpayers
(World Bank, 1995).
Before closing this section, reference should be made to the issue of taxation of the self-employed
and small enterprises.  As already discussed in section I in the context of the withholding tax,
owners of unincorporated businesses are, to a certain extent, legally able to minimize their tax bill.
This avoidance is due to the fact that labor is heavily taxed as a factor of production in Hungary. In
1994,  the total tax wedge on the average worker was 117% of the net wage, 81% of the gross wage,
and 54% of employer costs. 29 Individuals with earnings above the average wage even faced higher
tax wedges.  The tax system offered a way to circumvent high tax burdens legally by choosing a
special legal  status.  Owners of unincorporated partnerships (law  firms, medical offices, etc.)
receive labor as  well as profit distributions from their business.  The  favorable treatment of
dividends has opened a loophole allowing to minimize the tax bill by declaring (low-tax-rated)
dividends rather than (high-tax-rated)  labor remumerations. Recall that dividends are taxed at 40%,
whereas  tax  rates  of  up  to  48%  are  levied  on  labor  income.  In  addition,  social  security
contributions must be paid.
Facing a high tax burden, economic agents spend a lot of time and effort in tax planning and other
activities that are unproductive for the economy as a whole.  This applies to taxpayers seeking self-
employed status as well as to corporations adjusting their distribution policy to a distorting tax
system.  Since self-employed  income is harder to monitor than wages and salaries, the switch from
the  status of  employed to  self-employed often implies a  reduction in  compliance  as well  as
increased  auditing  costs  for  APEH.  The  introduction of  a  limit  for  profit  distribution  in
unincorporated  businesses does not represent an efficient remedy nor a systemic reform of the tax
code. It is an ad hoc measure which closes a loophole but does not address an underlying problem
in the incentive structure.
Section 3 -The Taxation of Capital Income in the European Union
Can Hungary draw lessons from the recent European experience with capital tax reform? Since
Hungary aims at accession to the European Union by the turn of the century, adapting its legislation
to that of EU countries could be a worthwhile objective.  This could be important, not so much
because direct taxation --and  capital income tax,  in  particular-- is  an  area where  the  acquis
communautaire is important (as discussed below,  this is  far from  being the case) but, rather,
because adapting tax laws to increasingly integrated capital markets in Europe is desirable. Neither
29  See World Bank, 1995, p.  17. The total tax wedge consists of the combined effect of personal income taxes and
social security contributions.-23-
the  tax  regime  in  individual  EU  Member  States  nor  EU  Commission proposals  provide  a
"blueprint" for a possible reform in Hungary.  However, the reform experience of Scandinavian
countries and Austria contains interesting lessons for Hungary. In this  section, we present an
overview of the tax regime  in  EU Member States and  on proposals under  discussion in  EU
institutions.  We  discuss  the  recent  reforms  of  capital  income  taxation  implemented  in
Scandinavian countries and in Austria, which follow the dual income tax approach.
Overview
Table 9 provides an overview of taxes on capital income in the member states in the European
Union and in Norway as of  1996. Column 1 shows corporate income tax rates, and columns 2 - 4
show the tax rates on interest, dividends, and capital gains  (Rates for capital gains refer to share
gains).  Tax rates relevant for residents are reported; due to double taxation agreements, rates for
non-residents will differ, in general.30 As seen in table 9,  there are substantial differences across
countries in the tax treatment of capital income.  Within countries, tax rates on capital income vary
between 0 and 62% in Denmark, and 0 and 74% in the Netherlands. Equal treatment is obtained in
Finland and Norway only, where a uniform rate of 28% applies to all types of capital income.
Interest payments are deductible from corporate income tax in all countries. Accordingly, tax rates
on interest either reflect the highest rate of the personal income tax or the rate of the withholding
scheme (if the latter is in  operation).  Rates range from  0% in  Greece, where  acquisition of
government bonds is favored by leaving their returns tax exempt, to 62% which is the highest PIT
rate in Denmark.
Dividends are taxed between 28 and 74%.  The rates reflect the composite effect of corporate
income tax, withholding taxes, and PIT, as well as different methods and degrees of integration of
corporate and personal income tax.  The Netherlands are the only country to  apply a classical
system of dividend taxation.  Dividends are first taxed under the corporate income tax (35%); the
net dividend is subject to the personal income tax of the shareholder.  Assuming the highest
marginal PIT rate of 60%, this implies an effective rate of 74%. On the other hand, double-taxation
is eliminated in  Germany.  Dividends are taxed according to  the  personal income tax of the
shareholder; corporate income taxes and withholding taxes paid on dividends are fully creditable
(,,imputation"). As a result, the marginal tax rates on labor and dividend income equalize.
Most countries operate systems that provide partial relief from double taxation at the shareholder's
level. Relief can be attained in two ways (see figure 1). First, corporate income taxes on dividends
are partially creditable against the PIT of the shareholder, as is the case in the United Kingdom and
30  Systems  of  corporate  and  capital  income  taxation  in the  EU  are  discussed  in Cnossen,  1993,  and  Daly,  1994.-24-
Ireland.  Second, a  reduced tax rate  is applied to  dividends at the personal level  (,,schedular
treatment").3'  Luxembourg applies only half of the PIT rate of the shareholder; Greece assumes a
PIT rate  of 0%.  Austria, Belgium,  Sweden and  other countries operate flat-rate withholding
systems with relatively low tax rates.  Relief from double taxation can be realized at the corporate
level as well, but no EU country runs such a system.  Germany imposes lower taxes on distributed
profits than on retained profits (,,split-rate system").  However, this is irrelevant from an economic
viewpoint since full integration is provided at the shareholder's level in any way.
Capital gains are rarely taxed at the personal level in the European Union.32 Greece does not tax
capital gains at all; other countries limit the taxation to certain cases, such as sales within given
periods from accrual (,,speculative sales") or sales of shareholders holding substantial parts of the
capital (normally  more  than  5%).  This  is  the  case in  Belgium,  France, Germany and  the
Netherlands.  In Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, capital gains are treated as normal
personal income and taxed under the personal income tax.  Note that Table 9 refers to realized
capital gains only.  At present, unrealized capital gains are not taxed in any Member Country of the
European Union.
Table 9 does not present a complete picture of capital income tax in European countries. First, the
table shows only statutory tax rates.  When bank secrecy is guaranteed, tax administrations find it
hard to collect taxes and evasion is high.  This, in particular, applies to countries not operating a
withholding scheme.  Second, tax exemptions differ markedly between EU member countries.
Germany runs a generous model, which exempts DM 6,100 (DM 12,200 for couples) of capital
income annually, leaving the capital income of 80% of the population untaxed.  Capital gains
remain untaxed up to L6,300 in the United Kingdom.  On the other hand, Austria and Finland grant
no exemptions at all.  Third, there is a vast number of exceptions.  In Finland, certain saving
accounts  and  bonds  are  exempted  from  withholding  tax  (PIT  applies  instead).  The  final
withholding tax in Denmark (25%) applies to dividend income up to 33,800 Dkr only.  Higher
income  is taxed  according to  the personal income tax.  If  taxed, exceptions  are particularly
widespread in the taxation of capital gains, where tax bases and rates vary widely across different
types of assets.
31  Meaning  reduced  in comparison  to the marginal  rate of the personal  income  tax.
32  We consider  the treatment  of capital  gains under  personal  income  and withholding  taxes. As mentioned  above,
apart  from  that  capital  gains  are taxed  at the corporate  level.Table 9: Taxation of Capital Income in the EU
(Tax rates in %)
Corporate Income  Interest  Dividends  Capital gains  Comments / Notes
Tax
Austria  34  25  50.5'  0  9  25% final withholding tax on
(34% + 25%)  interest and dividends
Belgium  40.2 (39% + 3%  15  49.2  09  15% final withholding tax on
surcharge)  (40.2 + 15)  interest and dividends. 2
Taxpayers may opt for PIT.
Denmark  34  623  50.5  010  25% final withholding tax on
(34% +25%)  dividends (40% when dividends
exceed Dkr 33,800)
Finland  28  28  28  28  28% ,,National Income Tax" on
capital income (withholding tax
on interest).
France  36.6 (33.3 + 10%  19.94  61.5 6  19.95  19.9% withholding tax on interest
surcharge)  (15% basic rate plus 4.9% social
contributions)
Germany  48.38 (retained) /  57  57  0  O9  25% / 30% withholding tax on
32.25  (distrib.) 7  dividends / interest (plus
temporary surcharge of 7.5%)
Greece  35  15 (0% on  0  0  15% final withholding tax on
government  interest. Dividends are taxed
bonds)  under the corporate income tax.
Ireland  38  48  58.1  40 12  Interest and dividends taxed
under PIT. CIT on dividends
partly creditable.
Italy  53.2 (37% central  12.5 (30% on  59.05 (53.2%  15 13  12.5% fmal withholding tax on
plus 16.2%  local)  bank deposits)  + 12.5%)4  interest  and dividends (30% on
bank deposits).
Luxembourg  34.32(33%  plus  51.253  51.15 (34.32%  09  Dividends: first taxed under CIT,
4% surcharge)  + 25.63%)  then half of the normal PIT rate
applies.
Netherlands  35  603  74  (35% +  014  Classical system of dividend
60%)  taxation.
Portugal  39.6 (36%  central  204  47.154  104  20% / 12.5%  withholding tax on
plus municipal tax  (39.6% +  interest / dividends (25% on
of normally 10%)  12.5%)  dividends of unquoted shares)
Spain  35  563  59.9615  20  25% withholding tax on interest
and dividends, which is fully
credited against the PIT.
Sweden  28  30  49.6 (28% +  30  30% withholding tax on capital
30%)  income.
United Kingdom  33  403  49.75  16  403  20% withholding tax on interest,
fully credited against PIT.
Memo item:  28  28  28  28  28% general income tax
Norway
(as of July 1996. Rates applicable to residents).I Dividends  taxed  under personal  income  tax for low-income  earners  (who face a PIT  rate smaller  than 25%).
225%  rate applies  to shares  issued  before 1.1.1994  and bonds issued  before 1.3.1990.
3 Taxed  under PIT  (highest  marginal  tax rate  is reported).
4Taxpayers  may opt for taxation  under  PIT.
5 In case  of ,,substantial  shareholders"  or ,,substantial  capital  gains".
6 Combined  effect  of personal  income  tax (highest  rate:  60.2%)  and CIT  that is partly  creditable  against  the PIT
payment.
745  / 30 % plus temporary  surcharge  of 7.5% of the tax amount  due. Not  taking  account  of local  taxes.
8 53%  highest  marginal  PIT  rate plus 7.5%  temporary  surcharge.  Not  taking  account  of local taxes.
9 Capital  gains are taxed  under PIT  when  realized  by ,,substantial  shareholders",  or within a given  period
(,,speculative  capital  gains").
'° Taxed  under PIT. In case  of long-term  capital  gains (asset  has been  held for more  than 3 years),  a 25% final
tax rate applies  (increased  to 40% on gains exceeding  DKr  33,800).
1  lHighest PIT rate. Withholding  tax of 27% is creditable  against  personal  income  tax due.
12 A reduced  rate of 27% applies  to capital  gains  of certain  shares.
13 Capital  gains  are taxed  at a flat-rate  of 25 % when  realized  by ,,substantial  shareholders",  or within  a given
period  (,,speculative  capital  gains").
14 Capital  gains are taxed  at a flat-rate  of 20 % when  realized  by ,,substantial  shareholders".
15 Personal  income  tax rate is applied  to net dividend  times 1.4  (i.e., tax credit  of 40% of net dividend  is
granted).
16 33% CIT  plus highest  personal  income  tax rate; 25% of the net dividend  is creditable  against  CIT.
Sources:  International  Bureau  of Fiscal  Documentation:  GET III: The Taxation  of Private
Investment Income, and GET VI: Taxation of Individuals in Europe. Amsterdam (loose leaf).-27-
With these caveats in mind, we can summarize the basic features of the European capital income
tax regime as follows.  EU member states apply rather low tax rates to interest payments and
discriminate against profit distributions.  Capital gains are not taxed in a systematical manner.
Most importantly, tax systems in the EU are far from providing an undistorted treatment of various
sources of capital income.  Tax rates, exemption levels, and methods of tax integration differ
widely within as well as across countries.  In other words, with respect to capital income taxation,
the degree of actual tax harnonization  is close to zero in the EU at present.  As capital market
integration started in 1993 in Europe, EU institutions undertook several efforts to harmonize capital
income taxes. The following section describes the most important proposals that were put forward.
Harmonization Efforts
Early EU proposals centered on the introduction of a withholding tax on capital income in the
member states of the European Union. 33 Most notable is the February 1989 draft directive of the
EU Council.  This directive proposed the introduction of a withholding tax on interest income of
residents of member states with a minimum rate of 15%.  All interest payments, i.e. interest on
bank deposits, government and private bonds would be taxed under this  scheme.  The directive
offered the option to use the tax as a final withholding tax on interest incomes of residents as well.
The Economic and Social Committee of the EU expressed general agreement with the Council's
draft directive in  July  1989, but  suggested to  apply a  lower tax rate  of  10%.  To  simplify
administration, it proposed the tax exemption of small interest amounts.
Neither the proposal of the Council nor that of the Committee were approved by Member States.
Luxembourg vetoed any form of taxation of capital income at source. United Kingdom (which had
reservations against steps towards more harmonization in general) and the Netherlands (home
country to many parent companies) rejected the proposal as well.  In the same vein, the Finance
Ministers of the EU (Ecofin) in May 1993 discussed a plan to introduce a uniform 15% withholding
tax on interest income of all EU resident but could not agree on a common position.
By late 1996, the EU Commission, asked by Ecofm in December 1993 to develop a new approach,
had not yet presented a proposal that all Member Countries could agree on.  On the contrary, the
,,Ruding Committee" as well as (draft) directives of the Commission stressed maintaining the status
quo rather than exerting pressure on EU Member Countries to  harmonize company taxes.  In
general, compared to concrete steps undertaken to harmonize indirect taxation, the European Union
appears reluctant to harmonize direct taxation.34
33  For a discussion of the different EU proposals see Trupiano, 1994.
34  This is in line with the Treaty of Rome (1957) which stresses  the need to harmonize taxes on goods and services.-28-
In conclusion, it cannot be said that countries seeking EU membership have a blueprint that they
can  follow.  Neither  the  practice of  capital  income taxation  in  Member  Countries nor  the
discussions within the EU bureaucracy provide a model for capital income taxes in countries in
transition.  By contrast to supranational developments in the EU, however, there have been some
far-reaching reforms in the field of capital income taxation recently in some Member States.  The
remainder  of  this  section  discusses  these  reforms,  undertaken  in  Nordic  countries  (the
,,Scandinavian  model") and in Austria.
Reforms in Nordic Countries
Since the beginning of the  1990s, tax systems in Nordic  countries (most notably Norway and
Sweden) and in Finland have undergone far-reaching reforns.  Although not limited to the reform
of capital income taxes, discussions in academic and political spheres centered on this element.  It
became common place to talk of the ,,Scandinavian model" of reforming capital income taxes,
although important differences between countries exist.35
The cornerstone of this model is the introduction of a ,,dual income tax" combining a progressive
tax on personal incomes (labor and self-employed income, transfer income, pensions, etc.) and a
flat-rate tax on all types of capital income (interest, dividends and taxable capital gains).36 The rate
on capital incomes typically equals the corporate income tax rate as well as the lowest marginal tax
rate on personal incomes.  The Scandinavian model, therefore, stands in  sharp contrast to the
"comprehensive income taxation" model put forward by Schanz/Haig/Simons, according to which
a single (progressive) tax schedule is applied to the sum of taxpayer's income from all sources.
The Swedish reform of capital income taxes was part of a thorough tax reform in 1990/91. In 1991,
a flat-rate tax of 30% on interest and dividends was introduced, and the corporate income tax rate
was reduced to 30%.  Since corporate income tax payments are not credited against capital income
taxes, the effective tax rate  on dividends is  51%.37  This, nevertheless, implies a  substantial
reduction compared to the top PIT rate that applied before.  Since 1995, the tax on capital income
covers capital gains as well. Interest, dividends, and capital gains are now taxed equally.
35  Denmark  started  its tax reforms  as early  as 1987. However,  the Danish  reforms  in capital  income  taxation  (taxation
remained  progressive  with  top marginal  rates  reaching  57%)  do not qualify  Denmark  as a ,,leading  reformer". Since  its
reform  approach  was very similar,  Finland  (although  not part of Scandinavia)  is often  considered  part of the ,,Nordic
model". For  thorough  discussions  of the reforms,  see  Viherkenttae,  1993,  and  Sorensen,  1994.
36  The  systematical  inclusion  of capital  gains  is one of the distinguishing  features  of the Scandinavian  reforms.
37  Double  taxation  of company  profits  was abolished  in 1994,  when the corporate  income  tax only was levied  on
dividends. This  measure  was valid for one year only;  see Muten, 1996. After some changes,  today tax rates again
stand  at 30%.-29-
Norway introduced a ,,general income tax" in  1992.  Under this tax, labor and capital income is
aggregated and taxed at a uniform flat rate of 28%.  Labor income is subject to additional taxes,
establishing progressivity of the system.  Double-taxation of dividends and capital gains is avoided
by entitling the shareholder for corresponding tax credits.  Hence, only the corporate income tax
(with  a  tax rate  of  28%) affects dividends and  capital  gains.  As  result, dividends, interest
payments, and capital gains are all taxed at the same rate of 28%.
Finland introduced a special tax regime for capital income in  1993.  The tax rate on interest,
dividends, and capital gains, first set at 20%, has been increased to 25% in 1995 and 28% in 1996.
The system of imputation of corporate and personal income taxes, in operation already before, was
maintained.  Residents must include dividends received (increased by a tax credit of 7/18 of the net
dividend) in their taxable income.  The income tax due is reduced by the amount of the credit.
Since the corporate income tax rate is 28%, a tax rate of 28% on dividends results, and all types of
capital income are taxed equally. 39
Despite the uniform label of ,,Nordic model", differences among the countries remained.  For
example, Norway  does  not  employ withholding  taxes  at  all,  Finland treats  interest  with  a
withholding tax, and Sweden applies withholding taxes to interest from bank deposits and to most
forms of dividends.  The use of withholding taxes is not a necessary ingredient of the Nordic
model.
In other respects, the uniform label is well deserved. Finland, Norway, and Sweden apply identical
tax rates to  all types of capital income. 40 Moreover, all countries systematically try to  include
capital gains in the base of capital income taxes.  As shown before, capital gains are either not
(directly) taxed in countries of the EU, or not systematically. The Nordic model tries to break with
this practice, at least dejure.
3S  The corporate income tax reduces profit distributions from 100 to 72.  In addition, the shareholder pays 20.16 (equal
to 28% of the net dividend of 72) as personal income tax.  The latter amount, however, can be claimed back in the
annual tax return.
Norway is the only Nordic country where double-taxation  of retained profits through the CIT and the capital income tax
on capital gains is ruled out.  The so-called RISK-method allows shareholders to increase the capital gains tax cost base
by the amount of profits retained.
39  For example, profit distributions of 100 are first taxed under the CIT at 28%.  The net dividend of 72 is increased by
a credit equaling 7/18 * 72 =  28.  The resulting National Income Tax payment of 0.28 * (72 + 28) = 28 and the tax
credit exactly cancel out.  The shareholder, finally, receives a dividend of 72.
40  Sweden realized a uniform treatment in 1994 only, when double taxation of dividends was abandoned; see footnote
37.-30-
According to recent data, it appears that the Scandinavian approach is performing well.  Parallel to
reductions of tax rates, capital income tax revenues in Sweden increased by 2.7% of GDP in 1991
(Sorensen, 1994). According to the Swedish Ministry of Finance, the increase in effective taxation
was  not  accompanied  by  adverse  distributional  effects,  because  capital  income  is  earned
predominantly by middle and high-income households.  However, it is still too early for a final
assessment and there is still a lack of comprehensive studies.
The Austrian Reform
Austria recently reformed the taxation of capital income. 41 On January 1, 1993, a withholding tax
was introduced, applying to all interest-bearing assets (saving accounts, private and public bonds).
The tax was extended to include dividends in 1994. The tax rate was of 22% (increased to 25% in
July  1996).  Capital gains are not captured by the withholding tax, but remain taxed under the
personal income tax.
In principle, the tax liability is final.  The law offers the option to include capital income in the
personal income tax assessment. In this case, the withholding tax is treated as a prepayment. The
incentive to do so is small, however.  First, only taxpayers in the lowest PIT bracket of annual
income up to AS 50,000 (approximately $ 4,500) face a marginal tax rate below 22%.42 Second,
the tax base is gross capital income, no matter whether the taxpayers chooses the withholding tax or
the personal income tax.  The switch to  the personal income tax, therefore, does not provide
additional deductibility  of expenses related to the purchase of financial assets.
Even if this is not obvious at first sight, the benefit of this scheme is that it establishes a level
playing field  for  capital income taxation.  Since corporate income  taxes  are not  deductible,
dividends are effectively taxed at 50.5%.  Capital gains are taxed under the PIT, which has a
maximum marginal rate of 50%. Interest payments are taxed at 25%, which equals an effective tax
rate of 50% with a nominal interest rate of 7% and inflation of around 3.5%.  Considering the
cumulative impact of CIT, PIT, and the withholding tax as well as inflation, a similar tax treatment
of all types of capital income for taxpayers in the highest PIT-bracket emerges.
The new Austrian tax scheme seems to have encountered a positive response from both economic
observers and tax practitioners, for several reasons.  Revenues from interest taxation increased
41  The reform  of 1993/94  was preceded  by long-winded  discussions  (including  rulings  of the Austrian  Constitutional
Court)  and a number  of gradual  steps.  A withholding  tax of 10%  was  introduced  in 1989,  which  served  as a prepayment
to the final  personal  income  tax liability.  For an appraisal  of the Austrian  reform  see Genser,  1996.
42 The lowest  marginal  PIT  rate  equals  1  0%.-31-
43 markedly, from AS 34.6 billion in 1989 to AS 51.3 billion in 1994.  Tax evasion, amounting to at
least 80% in 1988 (before the introduction of the 10%-withholding  tax) and discrimination against
honest taxpayers came to  an end.  Given that tax evasion is progressive, the application of the
withholding tax actually resulted in a more equitable distribution.  In addition, administrative and
compliance costs were reduced.44 Finally, neither capital outflows increased nor savings were
reduced after the introduction of the final withholding tax in 1993/94.45
However, the label ,,dual income tax" cannot be attached to Austrian reforms.  As shown above,
probably the most important feature of the dual approach is to apply a uniform, low tax rate on
capital income. In Austria, the treatment of different types of capital income is (relatively) uniform;
however, the composite tax burden on capital income resembles the highest personal income tax
rate rather than a reduced rate.
Section 4 - Toward a Reform of Capital Income Taxation in Hungary
This section discusses the options that are available to improve the current system of taxation of
capital income in Hungary.  The essential objectives to be pursued are that the tax regime should
not distort incentives to increase in domestic savings  (i.e., to minimize allocative distortions) and
should facilitate the establishment of a  'level playing field'  in financial markets.  Moreover, in
designing a new tax structure, the impact of inflation, as well as distributional and administrative
constraints must be accounted for.
Hungary's per capita GDP in 1993 was 37% of the EU average and two thirds of the per capita
GDP of Greece, the least wealthy EU member.  Therefore, in the context of EU integration, the
central issue for future generations will be the speed of the convergence of the Hungarian per capita
GDP to the EU average level.  To narrow the gap with other EU countries, accelerated growth in
Hungary, requiring high rates of savings, is necessary.  Table 10 (taken from Sachs & Warner)
compares per capita growth rates and rates of saving and investment in Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic with those of the less wealthy Member States of the EU and some fast-growing
43  Recall  that in 1989,  interest  income  was taxable  under the PIT. A 10% withholding  tax was credited  against  the
assessed  income  tax liability.
4  Compliance  costs  for  taxpayers  either  fell  to 0, or, when  the filing  option  was chosen,  remained  unchanged.  At the
same  time, the reduction  of the number  of people  filing  a tax return  reduced  administrative  costs  as well.
45  This  experience  was not shared  by West  Germany,  which  had  to abolish  a withholding  scheme  in July 1989 alf a
year after  introduction)  due  to massive  capital  outflows.-32-
46 Asian economies.  The table shows that the strong positive correlation between per capita growth
and savings and investment rates.  To ,,catch up" with the EU, Hungary would need to produce
higher growth rates than Greece, Ireland, Portugal, or Spain. Saving rates of 11% (the level reached
in 1994) will not be sufficient to attain this target. 47
Table 10: Growth, Savings, and Investment in Selected Countries
Real  GDP  Growth  Per  National  Saving  Investnent
Capita,  (% of GDP),  (%  of GDP),
1985 - 92  1985 - 91  1985 - 91
Chile  5.1  25.9  24.9
South  Korea  9.2  35.8  33.5
Malaysia  5.1  33.7  27.9
Singapore  5.7  42.3  33.1
Thailand  7.4  28.8  33.8
Greece  0.8  14.9  19.2
Ireland  3.7  17.0  17.6
Portugal  3.2  20.4  28.5
Spain  2.8  21.6  23.3
Czech  Republic  (1994)  2.8  21.1  20.0
Poland  (1994)  4.8  18.0  19.0
Hungary  (1994)  2.7  11.6  21.0
Source:  SachslWarner,  1996.
Can the tax regime contribute to higher national savings? Neither theoretical analysis nor empirical
studies provide a definite answer to this issue.  It depends on the impact of several effects which
can counteract each other.  The income effect of  a reduction of the tax rate will be negative
(households need to save less to attain a given post-tax capital income) but the substitution effect
positive (savings are increased because opportunity costs decreased).  Low tax rates might lead to
higher net savings, because incentives to deduct interest expenses against high marginal tax rates
will be reduced. But even if household savings increase, lower tax rates might reduce government
revenue, increase deficits and, hence, reduce national savings.
46  National  saving  equals  public  plus private  saving. Since  catching  up to, at least,  reach  the level  of the less wealthy
member countries of the EU is the primary issue, we concentrate on a comparison with Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain.
47  Hungarian saving rates increased between  1989 - 1992 (mainly due to precautionary savings), but fell  again
thereafter. Even in 1992,  when savings reached their peak at 13% of GDP, the rate was still considerably lower than in
the Asian economies (see Monthly Report of the National Bank of Hungary, 2/1994).  Empirical studies show a strong
positive and robust relationship across countries between savings and growth.  However, this does not imply  any
direction of  causality: whether savings drive growth, growth  drives  savings, or  both simultaneously. (For  recent
reviews, see Schmidt-Hebbel/ Serven/ Solimano, 1994, and Deaton, 1995).-33-
The empirical evidence is mixed. A direct linkage between a reduction in tax rates and an increase
in savings cannot be established in general, as it depends on the choice of the underlying model (see
Burgess/Stem, 1993, 796). As stated in a recent OECD study, ,,there is no consensus over whether
a higher rate of return to saving increases saving in the aggregate or reduces it" (OECD, 1994, 42).
However,  while  taxation  might  not  affect  the  level  of  savings,  it  certainly  influences  the
composition  of savings.  The portfolio choice of households will be distorted when the tax system
treats different types of financial assets differently.  Neutrality can be achieved with a uniform
treatment of all assets, for example with a comprehensive income tax or a flat-rate scheme for
capital income (OECD, 1994, 190). A clear tax policy implication is that the unequal treatment of
capital income should be avoided.  Instead tax rates varying between 0% on interest and 40% on
dividends plus PIT on capital gains, the playing field for different types of capital income should be
leveled as much as possible.
48
A reformed capital tax framnework  should improve efficiency in financial markets.  In Hungary,
financial markets are very  un-developed.  The market for bonds is  completely dominated by
government issues.  High levels of public  debt are reflected in a  relatively large market  for
government securities, which makes up 30% of GDP (1996).  The contribution of corporate bonds
is negligible; they are mainly issued by banks and leasing companies.  The market for equity is
small as well, equivalent to 7% of GDP.  Strict capital controls still exist.  For example, foreign
investors are not allowed to hold private bonds. In addition, foreigners need to apply for a special
trading license in case they wish to acquire public bonds with a tenor of less than one year or which
were issued before April  1996.  Due to these constraints, foreign investors only acquired 1% of
government securities (T-bonds) in 1995.
How does the tax system distort incentives?  First, in Hungary as in other transition economies,
growth depends largely on the build-up of new enterprises.  The latter generally have problems
providing collateral and therefore depend on equity financing. The Hungarian tax system imposes
relatively high costs on equity financing and, hence, discriminates against new enterprises. Second,
by favoring debt financing of  corporations, the tax  system increases the risk  of bankruptcy.
Another distortion is due to the fact that some entities (such as pension funds under the 1993 law)
enjoy preferential tax treatment. 49 These institutions are able to acquire company shares above the
,,appropriate" level, resulting in excessive profit distributions.
48  Governments  have a number  of tools at their disposal  to facilitate  the development  of financial  markets. Most
important  are the extent  and  structure  of government  borrowing,  regulation  and de-regulation  of financial  markets,  and
the tax system  (Stiglitz,  1991). If the tax system  favors  certain  types  of assets  and discriminates  against  others,  financial
markets  will not operate  efficiently.  Such  distortions  can entail  significant  economic  costs  (Tanzi/King,  1995).
49  Benefits  received  from the (voluntary)  funded  system  created  by the law  of 1993  are not taxable. Capital  income
accruing  to the fund is not taxable  either,  in line with  the general  principle  of not taxing  interest  on savings  deposits.
Contributions  (from  workers  or from employers)  are taxable  within  the PIT but, for contributions  up to HUF200,000-34-
The development and integration of financial markets would be best served by a tax system that
does not distort the choice between different types of assets.  The actual level of tax rates is of
secondary importance -- as long as it is not excessively high.  Small open economies must remain
internationally competitive and attract capital, and therefore cannot afford to have much higher tax
rates than their neighbors.  Adverse effects result much more from the differential treatment given
to different types of assets, combined with ad hoc changes in the tax system done almost yearly
since 1988, leading to uncertainty about future reforms.
Options  for the Reform of Capital Income Taxation in Hungary
The existing tax system in Hungary introduces distortions across various types of financial assets,
and weakens saving incentives. The reforms of 1997, aimed at fighting tax evasion, represent an ad
hoc change which does not address in a coherent fashion this central issue, i.e. the need for a
reduction of distortions.  In small open economies facing increasing competition on international
capital markets, inadequate tax laws can easily lead to capital outflows. A tax system that levels the
playing field for different types of assets and across different economic agents would facilitate
foreign investment and domestic savings.
Three basic options are available for the reform of capital income taxes. The first option is to move
the system closer to a comprehensive income tax.  No distinction would be made between capital
and labor income anymore, and the marginal tax rate on income from whatever source equalize.
Compelling arguments can be put forward against using this  approach.  An optimal tax setting
indicates a lower tax rate on capital, which is a more mobile factor of production than labor.
Second, the comprehensive income tax approach is dynamic inefficient because it discriminates
against investment in physical and financial capital. There are also practical considerations against
this approach. The costs of running a comprehensive income tax would be prohibitive in Hungary,
where administrative resources are already stretched to the maximum.  Increased capital mobility
and fierce international competition forces a  small, open economy like Hungary to  tax capital
income at relatively low rates.  Equity and ability-to-pay principles, providing the most important
support for comprehensive  taxes, become irrelevant when tax evasion is as high as in Hungary.
A second option is to exempt capital income from individual taxation completely. 50 There would
be good economic reasons for such an approach.  The solution is administratively simple and not
per year a tax credit  of 50% of contributions  is given. (Note  that annual earnings  average  H[UF500,000  at present).
Contributions  from employers  are not subject  to social  security  taxation.
50  Taxation  of capital  income  would  still  take place because  dividends,  capital  gains,  and possibly  interest  payments
are still taxed under the corporate  income tax.  ,,Exemption"  only implies that capital income is not taxed at the
individual  level.-35-
sensitive to inflation. The discrimination between savings in various types of assets would vanish.
Moreover, revenue losses would be small and could even be negative, if interest deductibility is
abolished. However, for political reasons, such a proposal would be difficult to accept. Acceptance
by the general public to forego capital income taxes is very low in virtually all countries.  The
concern that a small group of rich people would benefit disproportionately would, in all likelihood,
dominate public discussions even though, as we have seen above, the distributional impact of
capital income taxation is rather small in Hungary.
This opens the door for the third major option, which is the ,,dual income tax"  approach.  The
introduction of a  low  flat-rate tax on  capital income would  appear to  be  a  viable  model for
Hungary.  The Scandinavian experience has shown that, even in countries with a strongly social-
democratic tradition, it is possible to ,,sell" the proposal to the public.  We would propose the
introduction of a corporate income tax of 20 - 25% and a final withholding tax on interest at the
same rate.  The adoption of the dual income tax approach, for instance, in its Norwegian or Finnish
variants, would have several advantages  --  including the fact that such an approach is not far
removed from the system currently operating in Hungary.  Administrative simplicity is another
major advantage, given that bottlenecks in Hungary are more severe than in countries where the
scheme actually has been introduced. A dual income tax would provide equal treatment to all types
of financial assets, and therefore would not distort the workings of financial markets and savings
decisions.  Admittedly, it is unclear whether this scheme would actually stimulate savings -- but
this is an empirical issue which holds true for all approaches.
Two problems would remain.  First, interest income would be taxed at the same rate as other types
of capital income.  Hence, distortions due to inflation would not be removed.  The preferred  first-
best solution would be to combine the introduction of this scheme with a shift to taxation of  real
instead  of  nominal  returns  --  but  this  may  not  be  attainable/feasible given  administrative
constraints. Note that no country actually taxes real interest income. The tax-exemption of interest,
as  practiced in  Hungary at present, provides  a  viable  short-run solution in  face  of moderate
inflation.  In the medium run, however, a  dual income tax combined with  a deternined  anti-
inflation program is a superior solution. It removes an unjustified preference for saving in interest-
bearing assets and increases revenues.
Second, a dual income tax system would prevent some forms of tax arbitrage like shifting capital
losses to high-tax entities.  But it would create arbitrage possibilities of other types, for example to
transform labor income into capital income.  Standards would need to be worked out on how to
split the income of small enterprises into a capital and a labor component. Scandinavian authorities
apply an imputed rate of return to company assets.  The amount thus obtained constitutes an
,,appropriate"  return on investment; and residual profits are taxed under the personal income tax.51
51  For a general  description  see Sorensen,  1994. A very thorough  treatment  of the issue  can be found  in
Sorensen/Hagen,  1996.-36-
Of course,  this would  involve  solving  a number  of problems,  for example  whether  financial  assets
should be included in business assets, and the choice of the proper rate of return.  But these
problems  are common  to all countries  running  a tax system where capital  is taxed at lower  rates
than labor. Actual  solutions  adopted  by tax authorities  always  bear  an element  of arbitrariness  and
are often,  because  of that, the object  of long discussions.52  In our view,  this does not constitute  a
strong  argument  against  the dual  income  tax.
Criticism  has been raised against advice to introduce  tax schemes in countries  in transition that
work well in theory  but that were  never  realized  in practice. 53 This criticism,  fortunately,  does not
apply  to the dual income  tax approach. The  proposal  has been  tested in several  European  countries
with success. The advantages  and disadvantages  of the system  are well  known. The adoption  of
the Norwegian  or Finnish  model,  with a corporate  income  tax of 20 - 25% and a final withholding
tax on interest  at the same  rate,  in our view,  would  be well-suited  for Hungary.
52 Sweden is a country with a sophisticated tax administration. Nevertheless, it had  to postpone a coherent decision on
how to split the income of self-employed for three years.  Instead, until 11994,  the income remained to be taxed under
the personal income tax, with full deductibility of interest payments.
53  See Holzmann, 1992,  p. 245.-37-
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